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DURHAM, N.H. – Landmark regulations designed to detect and deter financial fraud via 
anonymous whistle-blowers can be dysfunctional and ineffective, according to new 
research from the University of Hampshire.
In the first study to investigate the effects of anonymous reporting channels and 
reputation threats on investigations of whistle-blowing allegations, Jacob Rose, associate 
professor of accounting at UNH, and co-author James Hunton, the Darald and Juliet Libby 
Professor of Accounting of Bentley College, find there are disturbing unintended 
consequences of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, which requires audit committees of 
publicly traded firms provide an anonymous whistle-blowing channel to employees in 
order to detect and deter financial fraud and to protect whistle-blowers from persecution. 
The research is published online and will appear in print in the Journal of Management 
Studies in the article, “Effects of Anonymous Whistle-Blowing & Perceived Reputation 
Threats On Investigations of Whistle-Blowing Allegations by Audit Committee Members.”
The study is based on an experiment in which 83 highly experienced audit committee 
members evaluated the credibility of a whistle-blowing allegation related to financial 
reporting malfeasance by corporate executive officers and allocated resources toward the 
investigation of the whistle-blowing allegation.
The researchers find that audit committee members can fail to sufficiently investigate 
whistle-blowing allegations received through anonymous whistle-blowing channels relative 
to non-anonymous channels, especially when the allegations pose reputation threats to 
the corporate directors. 
“We concluded that audit committee members who evaluate whistle-blowing allegations 
and determine whether or not allegations should be investigated treat anonymous and 
non-anonymous allegations very differently. Audit committee members find anonymous 
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allegations to be less credible than non-anonymous allegations. As a result, audit 
committee members often choose not to investigate an anonymous allegation, even when 
the allegation indicates very serious threats to the integrity of the financial reporting 
system. When an identical allegation is not anonymous, audit committees allocate 
significant resources to the investigation of the allegation. In brief, anonymous allegations 
appear to be ignored in many cases,” Rose said.
“What is particularly disturbing, however, is that we also find evidence that reputation 
threats faced by corporate directors have significant influences on decisions to investigate 
allegations. We find that when an allegation poses threats to a director’s professional 
reputation, a form of predecisional distortion of information occurs. Essentially, when audit 
committee members recognize that an allegation threatens their reputations, they have 
incentives to not investigate the allegation. These incentives cause the audit committee 
members to perceive that the allegation is less credible, which provides justification for 
deciding not to investigate the allegation,” Rose said. 
“The data indicate that reputation threats can create conflicts of interest, and directors 
appear to favor personal reputations over obligations to oversee financial reporting 
quality. Results suggest that anonymous reporting channels provide directors with a way 
to rationalize decisions to ignore allegations by ascribing low credibility to anonymous 
allegations that pose reputation threats. Regulators and shareholders currently rely on 
anonymous whistle-blowing systems to prevent and detect financial statement fraud. Our 
findings call into question whether anonymous whistle-blowing actually improves 
corporate governance,” he said. 
The researchers believe substantial changes must be made regarding who evaluates 
whistle-blowing allegations.
“The effectiveness of whistle-blowing mechanisms is critical for the prevention of financial 
statement fraud. We believe that it is now essential to determine who should be charged 
with evaluating anonymous allegations. If we want whistle-blowing mechanisms to be 
effective, then shareholders, regulators, and academics need to identify an independent 
third party who can determine the veracity of allegations without being influenced by 
reputation threats,” Rose said.
Jacob Rose is an associate professor at the University of New Hampshire Whittemore 
School of Business and Economics. He conducts experimental research related to 
judgment and decision-making in the contexts of corporate governance, auditing, and 
accounting. He has published psychology-based studies in a wide variety of academic 
journals and holds a Ph.D. from Texas A&M University.
The UNH Whittemore School of Business and Economics offers a full complement of high-
quality programs in business, economics, accounting, finance, marketing, and hospitality 
management. Programs are offered at the undergraduate, graduate, and executive 
development levels. The school is accredited by the Association to Advance Collegiate 
Schools of Business, the premier accrediting agency for business schools worldwide. For 
more information, visit http://wsbe2.unh.edu/.
The University of New Hampshire, founded in 1866, is a world-class public research 
university with the feel of a New England liberal arts college. A land, sea, and space-grant 
university, UNH is the state's flagship public institution, enrolling more than 12,200 
undergraduate and 2,200 graduate students.
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